![]() ![]() ![]() This is controversial because Diyala is, or at least has been, a majority Sunni Arab province. ![]() Badr’s grip on the province entered a new stage after Muthanna al-Tamimi, a Badrist who had been chairman of the provincial council, was elected as governor of Diyala on May 26. Ameri promptly took the lead as “field commander” of the new Anbar offensive, only to decide in early June-apparently entirely on his own-to shift focus to Fallujah, which lies between Ramadi and Baghdad.īadr is also the only militia-political party that dominates a specific province (Diyala), a fact that cements its role in the country. Although Prime Minister Abadi initially held back the militias in Anbar out of fear of sectarian conflict, he gave way after the security forces defending the provincial capital of Ramadi collapsed on May 17. Yet the militia-led offensive was forced to step back from Tikrit to let the U.S.-led international coalition conduct airstrikes against dug-in jihadis, allowing the formal security services-army and federal police-to lead the liberation of the city. Iran, through Badr, initially played more of a role in the offensive than Iraqi leaders did, and photos of the infamous Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani sometimes appeared alongside Ameri himself, dominating media coverage. But the ministry of human rights-also held by a Badrist, Mohammed Mahdi al-Bayati-sent a senior official to speak at Badr’s February 16 celebration of their victory in Diyala and defend the conduct of the Badr-led Hashd.Īmeri’s military preeminence continued in March with the launch of the operation to liberate Tikrit and northern Salahuddin. Badr and other militias sustained criticism that they were engaging in retribution attacks and attempting to cleanse the Sunni population from these areas. By February 2015 Badr had secured Diyala, whose narrow Sunni Arab majority is nestled between Baghdad and Iran. In October 2014, Ameri was often described as the “ leader” of the militia-led offensive to subdue Jurf al-Sakhr, a mostly Sunni area south of Baghdad, and consolidate Shia control around the capital. Prior to leaving office, Maliki had made Ameri the military governor of Diyala-an informal appointment usually described euphemistically as al-masuul al-amani (the security official)-which he remains to this day.Īmeri, now on leave from parliament, has captured far more renown in his militia commander role than he ever did as a cabinet minister. Under the new government of Haider al-Abadi, Ameri was able to get a member of his party, Mohammed Salem al-Ghabban, confirmed as interior minister. opposition-has been transportation minister since Maliki’s second cabinet and is now a parliamentarian. ![]() Badr’s military commander, Ameri-who tried and failed to get an appointment as minister of defense or interior, in part due to U.S. No other militia-political party was better prepared to capitalize on the collapse of Iraqi security forces in northern Iraq last June. It also symbolizes how Iraqis’ hopes for a democratic country governed by the rule of law have given way to a political system that is expressly sectarian and increasingly resembles a garrison state. During the procession Badrists carried the Iraqi flag and their own militia’s flag, a yellow-and-green design of a rifle overlaying a picture of Iraq, reminiscent Lebanese Hezbollah’s.īadr-founded in the 1980s in Iran, its continued supporter-is not only the most important of the various armed groups composing the Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd). The procession was similar to that which a general in the Iraqi army might receive, and alongside Badr leader Hadi al-Ameri marched key figures of Iraq’s Shia political establishment-Vice President Nouri al-Maliki, Deputy Prime Minister Bahaa al-Araji (the Sadrist Movement’s highest-ranking official), Islamic Supreme Council of Iraqi (ISCI) leader Ammar al-Hakim, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (a long-time Iranian asset who oversees the part of Iran-backed militias in the war effort), and National Security Advisor Faleh al-Fayyad, among others. On July 14, the Badr Organization held a funeral procession in Baghdad for several of its leaders who had died fighting the Islamic State (IS) in Anbar, including Abu Muntadhar al-Muhammadawi, Badr’s national operations chief Abu Habib al-Sakini, commander of Badr’s Fourth Brigade and Abu Sarhan al-Sabihawi, head of the Fourth Brigade’s operations. ![]()
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